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.... I bring you good news of great joy which will be for all the
people! I

In the moment of elation at this Word, one should not too easily
comfortable with the Good News. The Gospel is a subversive proclamation.
It subverts the tentative essays of the feminist project even while often siding with those feminist voices as they are raised in protest and in plea for a
larger justice than the Western philosophical project has been able to deliver. It recognizes and yet subverts our self-assurance that we "know"
Professor of Law. Hallliine University School of Law. Thanks [0 my co-paneliq Susan
Stabile. to Elizabeth Schiltz. to members of the University of SL Thomas Law Journal staff. to Illy
research assistant. Melanic Bormetr. and to the staff of the Hallliine Law Library for IhlCir wonderful help as this manuscript was developed.
I. Luke 2:10 (New American Standard Version)
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about work: about what is valuable work, about how women work, and
about how women as workers are engaged by men and by society generally.
The Gospel is subversive in many ways relevant ,to the problem of
women and work, subverting what we think we know, and how we understand the link between relational responsibility and justice. First, as this
article will suggest, in thinking about work, Lutheran feminists would want
to go beyond the existing claims of feminist scholars about how we can
know what we know. Before the law can support "good work," we must
know what work is for human beings and how women experience workplaces. While Lutherans side with feminists in valuing contextual ways of
knowing, they would argue that the Gospel subverts all-including feminist-understandings of how we know what we know? In subverting feminists' search for a new foundation of knowledge once the Western project
has been dismantled, the Gospel insists that our turn to contextual knowing
must embrace a larger context than the social and material conditions in
which women work.
Second, feminists have focused on relationality as at the core of all
important human endeavors,3 including work. While Lutheran feminists
would share this focus, they would argue that the Gospel is subversive in
demanding a more genuine and inclusive relationality that decenters all
human efforts to describe what is at stake in working relationships. A key
conundrum for many feminists has been the challenge of negotiating the
conflict between their ethical and experiential preference for care of the
other with the facts of economic and social oppression of women that sometimes result when others take advantage of women's care. 4 For Lutherans,
the Gospel reaffirms the rightness of sacrificial neighbor-love in a way that
does not necessarily carry the baggage of the inevitable victimization of
women.
A preliminary and necessary admission to those who stand outside the
Lutheran or Christian tradition: my argument about the way in which Lutheran feminism would reconstruct the boundaries of knowledge and care is
necessarily my own; it builds upon a long tradition of Lutheran ethics but a
relatively short historical period of discussion among feminists who are
2. DEANNA A. THOMPSON, CROSSING THE DIVIDE: LUTHER, FEMINISM AND THE CROSS 102,
114 (2004) (noting that Lutherans and feminists share a commitment to a hemleneutics of suspicion, to a critical method and to a focus on experiential dimensions of knowing, but noting that
"Luther's dialectical approach to human existence and God's alien and proper work allows for a
deeper accounting of sin as harm done to others" that would affect how we understand what we
can truly know).
3. See, e.g., Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modem Friendship: Dislocating the Community, in FEMINISM AND COMMUNITY 187, 187 (Penny A. Weiss & Marilyn Friedman eds., 1995)
(noting the "predominant theme" of feminist thought is a critique of abstract individualism and "a
conception of the self as inherently social").
4. See. e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND
AMERICAN LAW 268-276 (1990) (describing how family members who lack privilege are endangered both by rights-based approaches and relational approaches that deny them basic rights).
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Lutherans about what the dialogue between these t\\O tradition>.; would uncover, There is no authoritative "Lutheran femini~l" tradition, at lea,>r not
yet. Christian feminist voices, and even Lutheran feminist voices, arc multivalent, as was Luther's own. On one hand, to speak as a Lutheran fcmini:-.t
is to speak only for myself; each woman speaks a singular argument out of
a lived faith tradition as well as her experience and thoughts about women's
life-work, work in which any modern woman is immersed. More broadly, it
is always important to acknowledge that scores of intellectual children
birthed by both feminist jurisprudence and Lutheran theology bear new life
for the law, and one can find such plenitude even within the seemingly
narrow confines of Lutheran feminist theology itself." However, to stress
such diversity does not foreclose the possibility of identifying distinctively
Lutheran feminist themes that I hope this article wi 11 fairly, it incompletely.
represent. Many Lutheran feminist claims will bear a clear family resemblance while others will noL 6
Identifying the commonalities within a tradition such as Lutheranism
is not just important to nourish those feminists of faith who live within the
law and our own religious tradition. Our insights can similarly nourish
those from other traditions, religious and secular. whose lives the law and
the tradition shape because their wisdom can challenge ours. The challenge
for Christian feminists. including Lutherans, is to en~l1re that our in:-.ights
continually resound with our opening message. the Good News. Whether
we dream of better justice or stand in critique of law, oLlr insights can be
authentic and true only so long as we keep in the center of our imagination
the true hope that is within us.

10 l'lhies and law. I~I" 1'11'''11'''''' .
no Ie 2: MARY M. SOl fll:R(;, COMl'lcLUr<C; K,,()wLEDcE: A FI"~1f!"IS I PI'''I'''S·I! H It{ AN f·.I'IS
I'EM()U)( ,Y OF TilL CROSS (19')7 J: Ann Pederson, Cotnersatioll.1 Tmrllrt! (//1 Ongoing Lurlierlill
RefilFlfllllioll. 24 CURRIAIS IN TIIEOU)(;Y !\ND I\1ISSIOI' .'i (1997\: Kristen KVClm, "nil' SILeat (li'/!,,'
Brmr is ,,!{'vf!IIIV Kin(h:" twill'r 011 (he Dillies ofAd<ll1/ ({lid Hi.1 SOl/I. 24 C1RRI.YI S I, Ti II·(JI ()(,'
\ ,I) 1\11';SIO'; 44 (1'!97),

S. Among Lhos.; vOices who have done wOI'k n:kvanL

.I'll/II'((

6. E",:n duthenllenlly LlJ[hcran contributions from feminisl lheologians may create di,,,onunce aillong LlIthcrall traditionalist,. See Pederson. SiI!lm note 5, at 6. On the other halle!. in Illy
VICW, il i, aho Important to be l'arelul aboutlhc fact that some who affiliate with Lutheran congn:gations and institutions do 110t tor do not alwuys) make <lrgllmenh con,is(ent wJlh n:cogni/,'d
Lutheran theology. As with other streams within a religious tr,ILiitloll, 110fl-Lulhcr;!n, \Vho conic
"pon "a Lutheran who is a feminist" need 10 probe with care whether tile individual', nrgllllll'nts
arc consi,lelll with tbe core of the Lutheran witness behnl' a'-Sociating rl'lllinist theologics with
Lutheranism. A, an example of a Luthcran-affiliated theologian utilizing lloll-Luther,1n arpullcnl:-.
see, e.g .. Mari! Trclstad, Rc/oriOlwiity Plus IndiridualitL' The Value ,,/ eremite Sell' ;\gmCl . .'X
Dl~I.Ol; 191, 19X (1999) (employing a Whiteheadian perspective to argue that it can he damaging
(0 "preach" relalionality to women who have had their ·'intrinsic. subjective being violated," and
urging thaI women's struggk "is not to see themselves as a part of a risky relationalil). bUI lila"
be. rather. to affirm their own 'ego boundaries' in psychoanalytic tcrms, 'inlrinsic \alue ur
agency in process tl'rms. or place, of plain safety in very practical lefllrs"\.
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How WE K"Iow How WOMEN WORK AND SHOULD WORK:
DEEPENING CONTEXTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND
AVOIDING FOUNDATIONALISM

Lutheran-Feminist Agreement on Knowing As Contextual

As suggested, Lutheran feminists would approach the problem of
knowledge in ways similar to secular feminists-by focusing on deep, contextual "knowing" that can only be partial and contested, but they would
interrogate even traditional feminist methods for knowing what we know. A
major effort in modern feminist jurisprudence has been to undermine the
Western turn to abstraction as the major methodology for understanding the
truth and resolving important ethical as well as legal issues. 7 Feminist lawyers have called for a return to contextual investigation about reality and
contextual reasoning about justice in diverse critiques. 8 They have sided
with historians and Crits in demanding that the context of legal rule-making
must be considered in critically examining the law; they have argued that
social policy and historical movements play a key role in shaping law in
ways that produce as many unjust results as just ones. 9 They have lifted up
the particular context of the lives of women as a missing, almost deliberately ignored element of consideration when judges and legislators have
made law. iO In proving how women have been invisible to the law, they
have given countless examples, from women's legal incompetency in the
nineteenth century! I to the recurring theme of the limits that reproduction
and child care place upon women's social possibilities in the twenty-tirst
century. 12
7. See NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK. FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY; A PRIMER 13,
48-49 (2006) (describing feminist "special attention" on contextual reasoning).
8. See. e.g., MINOW, supra note 4, at 322 (critiquing abstract reasoning for obscuring ambiguity of problcms and human relationships, and empowering wrong/right argumentation rather
than recognition of convergent ideas, in the context of life and death decisions).
9. See, e.g., JUDITH A. BAER, QLR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 72 (1999) (describing feminists' rejection of reason and '''rigorous logical manipulation of abstractions' in favor of 'sensitivity to context and ... a faith in emotion and intuition as tools of thought'.. (citing Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, in FEMINIST
JlJRISPRUDENCE 44-45 (Leslie Friedman Goldstein ed. 1992»).
10. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCI10N TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 4-5 (2d ed.
2003) (describing the recurring theme of "the importance of women's experience" in feminist
scholarship and arguing that women's injuries have been unrecognized or minimized because
"women's experience is not adequately expressed in the law").
I L See Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of
Law, in FEMll>;IST LEGAL THEORY; FOUl>;DATIONS 9, 10 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) (describing
women as "legal nonentities unable to sell, sue or contract without the approval of their husbands
or other male relatives").
12. See. e.g., BAER, supra note 9, at 145 (arguing that men help to sustain women's inequality by refusing to share birth control, child care, household work, and financial responsibility with
their children's mothers); TOVE STAl>;G DAHL, WOMEN'S LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 104-107 (Ronald L. Craig trans., 1987) (arguing that women's pregnancies and
caretaking responsibilities are largely forced upon women and prevent them from gaining selfdetennination and self-realization).

WOA1EN'S 'WORK

20071

-iO!)

Feminists, however, charge that abstract ways of knowing cause morc
harm than simply blinding lawmakers to essential pieces of the social puzzle that law attempts to set in order. I \ Feminists also claim that abstract
reasoning about truth, on its own, permits lawmakers to distance themselves
from those who seek justice, or indeed to blame victims in the legal system
for their own misfortunes. 14 As they have proposed new justice and new
ways in which the legal system should interact with women, feminists have
also called for lawyers to account for and honor their client's lifc as they
communicate and decide with, and advocate for their clients. I
The sphere of women's work exemplifies the problem with ignoring
context in favor of abstract thinking as well as any other. We might take the
conundrums of modern-day divorce and sexual harassment as two examples. Attempting to resolve the courtroom acrimony of divorce, lawmakers
designed no-fault dissolution regimes that acknowledged, but did not fully
understand, what it means that women' ~ domestic work is unpaid. These
regimes, designed around an abstract understanding of gender equality, employ a presumption that equal division of assets would achieve equal opportunity for both men and women. 16 Yet, despite statutory laundry-lists of
factors that authorize judges to deviate from perfectly equal division, the
failure of lawmakers and judges to truly understand the effects of unpaid
women's labor on their property and income status has resulted in the creation of serious property outcome inequalities between men and women after
divorce. I? As feminist legal theorist Judith Baer puts it, "The truth we can
get at through the legal language is that laws [that award only wives alimony J discriminate against men. The truth we cannot get at is the harm
divorce law does to women." Ii< Had these seemingly progressive lawmakers
Sf(' Ll'VIT & VEIKHICK, SlIj)1'({ Dote 7. at 51·52 (noting how legal slOry-telling l~tils to
take account
women's expericnces).
14. See. e.);., CHAMALl.AS, .It/I'm note 10. at 73-74 (noting "judicial inscn,ilivity" to hattered
women and "examples of judges hlaming women for 'provoking' violence against them and displaying irritation at having to spend valliahle com! time attempting to get to the hotlol11 of family
disputes").
15. .','ee Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizaheth M. Schneider, Felllillisl Lef!,aj Theon" Felllillisl
fIlfl'lrwkillf!" ({lid [he Legal Prof{'\·sioIJ. 67 EORDHA'vl L. Rl·.v. 249, 258. 267 (1998) (cIescrihlllg
Cynthia Fuchs Epstem' s history of fClIl1l11st law finns that attcmpted to "democratize aHorneyclicnt relation" and c,whlish egalitarian working communities" ,lilt! C.IITic MenkelMeadow's
research suggesting that women lawyers. following an ethics of' carc, "would
adversarial
modes of practice and seek modes of lawyering that take the interests of all panies into account
and endeavor to preserve thc rciation,hips among them" and "orgurnze their work relationship, in
a Ie", competitive, more collahoriltive and egalitarian manner").
16. Sec CllJ\MALLAS, .l'IIpm note 10, at 32 (noting that no~!'ault divorce gained popularity in
an era when fcmini,ts enVisioned equal sharing oj' fanlily life between men and women and supported "equal. non-gender-based standards" for divorce. custody and child support. despite feminist skepticism about its benefit,).
17. Sec BAER, supra note 9. at 104-105 (descrihing the cOlllrihllllon of divorce to the "!'('miIlll:ation of poverty" because of the declining economic statlls of ex-wi vc, as compared with their
ex-husbands).
18. hi. at 105.

or
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and judges understood in a deep way the relationship between women's
unpaid and underpaid labor, such as the limitations that child care responsibilities put on their ability to earn and accumulate assets, the inevitable
failure of a facially "equal" policy of asset distribution in divorce would
have been clearer.
Similarly, we might note how difficult it was for women to achieve
parity of workplace conditions because of abstract thinking about the nature
of equality and discrimination. It has now become something of a running
joke among feminists and judges that sex discrimination was only included
in Title VII in order to trivialize and defeat the law. 19 But if we look at the
campaign that had to be mounted for judges and lawmakers to recognize the
connection between hostile, sexually subordinating conduct in the workplace and the unequal position of women,2° we see the consequences of
understanding equality as an abstraction. Lawmakers' failure to ask real
women how their productivity and dignity are affected-and to take their
answers seriously-when their supervisors can grope, sexually demean and
proposition them without reproach, has slowed not only the development of
the doctrine, but also its implementation?l
Beyond specific "told you so" examples like divorce, however, feminists sometimes have difficulty explaining why contextual thinking is more
likely to gain purchase on the truth than abstract reasoning. Some seem
almost to resort to the argument that this is how women do think, and so it
must be a valid way of understanding the world,22 yet, such an argument, if
19. But see Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional loke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
137, 138~142 (1997) (arguing that this commonplace notion is incorrect and that "feminists who
strongly supported the inclusion of sex as a protected class ... secured its passage into law"),
20, See, e.g., Katherine H. Flynn, Note and Comment, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Sex,
Gender and the Definition of Sexual Harassment Under Title Vll, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099,
1103-1104 (1997) (describing, inter alia, early courts' rejections of Tille VII sexual harassment
claims because such harassment was "based on desire and not specifically on the gender of the
victim ... 'a personal proclivity. peculiarity or mannerism' and an attempt to satisfy 'a personal
urge,'" and a "distasteful and unfortunate occurrence" unrelated to the victim's employment, and
their view that "[t]o allow sexual harassment claims under Title VII would turn every 'pass' into a
potential lawsuit, would ignore the reality of natural sexual attraction between men and women,
and would invite false claims of sexual advances as retaliation for negative employment decisions
or discipline").
21. See, e.g., Avon L. Sargent, Topical Summary, Are the Legal Remedies Available to Sexually Harassed Women Adequate? 20 WO!vlEN'S RTS. L. REP. 185, 189 (1999) (noting that "many
victims believe that their employer's grievance mechanisms are designed to protect the employer
instead of the employee." that "a number of corporations failed to provide their equal employment
or affirmative action staff with sufficient independence and authority" resulting in inadequate
prevention or investigation of claims, and that "many employers, including local governments, do
not have policies, complaint procedures, and training in place to address sexual harassment").
22. See, e.g., CHAMALLAS, supra note 10, at 56, 59 (describing the critique of conservative
readers of Carol Gilligan and Robin West's work for tracing "the origin of sexual differences to
biology").
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it indeed is sufficient. certainly does not establish the priority of contextual
ways of knowing over logical reasoning or other speculative inquiry.

B.

The Lutheran Tradition Oil Kllowledge-Finilwn Capax intlniti

Lutheran feminists stand together with other feminists in lauding the
turn to contextual jurisprudence. Luther himself was famously a contextual
thinker. Whether he was writing a sermon for his uneducated congregants
or a commentary on the Bible. parsing a papal document or engaging a
noted academic. Luther reflected his basic interpretive view. which was rhetorical and concrete: '''[LJet God's word be what it may, I must pay attention and know to whom God's word is addressed.' "2.3 Indeed, Lutheran
theologians argue that to the extent he spoke of broad and abstract truths, he
built those truths from the ground up, from his personal experience and that
of others.=: + Not one to make purely abstract pronouncements about eternal
principles and universal truths-except for the one Great Truth-his theology is shaped \\'ith a keen sense of engagement with the Other. He argued .
.. 'Experience alone makes a theologian .... It is by
rather it is
by dying and being damned that a theologian is made. not by understanding. reading or speCUlating.' ":5 Indeed. theologian Ann Pederson argues.
Luther's central insight of "justification by grace through faith alone was
hardly an 'abstract' doctrine of Luther; rather it grew out of his experience
coram deo [in the presence of God].'·2h
There are good. Lutheran reasons for a contextualized, narrative-drivcn
approach to the key problems of the human condition, whether in telling thc
good news that Luther was obsessed to proclaim. or puzzling about the
demands of justice. In explaining this approach, Luther focused on the core
of the Gospel message: ./illifWlI capax infilliti (the finite is the bearer of the
infinite).:'7 Pederson explains that Luther fought both Aristotle and many
Reformers whom he debated about the Eucharist. claiming that "it i~ in
Jesus the human one and in this created, earthly world where God is found.
God is found in, with. and under the created order .. :'ubiquitous. "both
present at the right hand of God and in the elements of the Lord's supper. "eX
13. Beverly.r. SlraUol1. Here We Stullt!: LllIilemll and Felllilli.,-1 1\'.1'111'.\ ill Bilili('(/lll1/frpn'lulioll. 2-1- C, '''RL'l1 S l'l Ml.sSI()N 23. 17 ( 1997) (quoting ,\1."" 1If' Ll1rJIER. 35 LlITIlER'S \VORK' 17()
Lianblm Pelikan ed .. Concordia Puhlishing HOtbc. 1935-861).

::-:f. SCI' S()L8U{( i . .I'llI'm note 5. at 56-57. 83: Pederson. supm note
al 10, I I (noting
Llither', approach \Hb to reflect on det~lik parlicular and concrete, ilnd to mOve to the ahstractl.
2'i. SOLBcRl<. IIlpm n,)IC 'i. at 57 (quoting M,\IUIl'-; LITHER, 54 LLllll,R', W()RKS 7 iJarosla\
Pc,ltkan cd., COI1COrcila Publishing House 1935--R6); IV! -\RTI0' LUIIIER, D. M."R Ill'-; Ll Tflcl{'
\\.'1' Rk.L: Km11Sl'I11 Gl,A:vlf-\lISUAHF 5, 163.28 (Weimar: Hermann B{ihlillb NUchfolgcr 19081
tlXX3l!.
~6, Pederson. slIpra note 'i. at II.
27 Id. at 10.
18. Id.
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In Lutheran theology, what we can know about our own world is not
revealed in the same way as our salvation, but it is discern able using the
multiple ways we human beings have of knowing. 29 Yet, finitum capax infiniti gives strong analogical justification for us to prefer contextual investigation: if the finite is the bearer of the infinite, then it is first to the finite
that those who would know the world must look. Feminist lawyers have
been saying this for a long time: it is not in the abstractions such as justice
and fairness that we will find either the problems that plague human beings
or their solutions. 30 A Lutheran feminist might argue that it is only in viewing the actual relations between persons in the world, how they oppress
each other or partner with each other, how they swallow up the earth's
goods or act as stewards of those goods, that we will come to know what
we must about the world. Indeed, the feminist emphasis on real justice as
being embodied, as not being separated from our experiences and senses,
our suffering, our laboring, as much as our thinking, is caught up in this
concept. 3l
Contextualized jurisprudence about work requires a deep appreciation
of the lives of men and women who work-one that goes beyond statistical
verities such as the differences between men and women's pay, 32 or the
number of hours that women put in doing domestic work after they have
completed their paid labor. 33 While these statistics are helpful starting
places to identify the existence of unjust structures as well as effective evidence lending veracity to individual women's description of their situations,
they do not do justice to the complex experience of women working.
Nevertheless, a simple resort to women's narratives or studies to
counteract the abstractions that theory and statistics offer is not enough to
satisfy the demand for contextual knowing. Lutherans come to the observation and evaluation of social life with deep suspicion about how humans
construct their ways of knowing/4 whether in individuals' narratives of
29. SOLBERG, supra note 5, at 77,82 (noting Luther's view that reason "used in its proper
domain-to draw logical conclusions, for example, or in human cultural endeavors" was an important source of human knowledge; and Althaus' view that for Luther, experience was a medium
for the receipt of knowledge).
30. See, e.g., BAER, supra note 9, at 72-74 (describing Joan Williams' contrast of Enlightenment thinking which celebrates reason and "rigorous logical manipulation of abstractions" toward
truth with feminist epistemology, and describing conventional legal theory as a "reasoned, dichotomous, oppositional, hierarchical, abstract, and deductive epistemology of separation").
31. See Mary M. Solberg, Notes Toward an Epistemology of the Cross, 24 Cl:RRENTS IN
THEOLOGY AND MISSION 14. 17-18 (1997).
32. The relative status of pay women have received for the kinds of work they do has long
been a subject of feminist legal theory. See, e.g., CHAMALLAS, supra note 10, at 187-189 (arguing
that women's jobs are devalued, and paid as much as twenty percent less in 19805 studies).
33. [d. at 192-93 (discussing devaluation of women's household labor and noting studies
demonstrating that working women still do disproportionately more bousework than men in the
same households).
34. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 102 (describing the "hermeneutics of suspicion"
shared by feminists and Lutherans); Carl H. Braaten, God in Public Life: Rehabilitating the Or-
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their own experiences or statistical or other "material" investigations of social patterns, The Lutheran emphasis on the way in whieh sin infects both
reason and the wi1l 3'i requires deep skepticism about what we have designated as "just'· or "equal'" and how we have come to know the conditions of
work and home life. Lutherans believe that the ways in which we construct
and determine what "the world is," including our most scientific methodologies, are pervasively scarred by our will to re-vision things to justify ourselves and to assimilate what we know and what we see to our own finitely
understood self-interest. J (,
In this view. women are no more exempt from the sin of self-justification and self-regard than men, even if the ways in which these sins are
manifested may be somewhat different, One implication of this view is that.
notwithstanding Victorian sentimental views that women are innocent
souls,37 any account of work that essentializes and prefers women' s
strengths and virtues without admitting their vices and weaknesses must be
viewed with suspicion.
Lutheran theologian Mary Solberg describes the yield of this hermeneutic of suspicion in ways that any postmodern feminist would find resonant: our knowing is necessarily limited. interpreted. partial, and
contested,3X One might say. in Lutheran terms. that broken knowledge is as
much due to our own sin as the sinful structures arollnd us;"'! our natural
finitude, moreover, limits humans' ability to understand themselves through
experience or any form of human knowledge.
The metaphor that reminds Lutherans, conversely, that the finite is not
the infinite, that we cannot know the full truth either through empirical observation or through intuition or abstract reasoning is this: God absconds:
God hides from lIs"~() Our work is but a set of the masks of God; however.
deI'S of Cr1'lltioll, FIRST Tlll"l3S, Dec. 1990, at 34 (noting that natural law i.., alway, '["peCl becau,c it is discovered hy human reason uh,cured hy evil); S[)I BI'Rn, ,I If/1m note :;, :It 77-7'),
98-99 (noting. inter lllio, Luther', view that God call1lot he knnwn "through thcn!l)gy" withl'ui
rcvelatlOn, and thai "cven gond thcolDgy was an imperfect, s[lImhling, and ,omciilllcs illternall)
contradictory-hut ahove all. human .., allclllpt to dcscrihe. clarify. and interpret what God 1<>
vcaled to/through faith ill lile doily living (ll iI").
35. See MI,'HAEL G. BA YI.OR, ACTIO:" ,""D PcRSO": C'Ol',S('IEI',l'[, I"
SCH()L\S I'I('ISM
,\NIl HIE YOllNG L1ITIIER ISO (1977) .
.'fl. For a lengthier discw"ion of Luther's \ iew of the working, of the conscience, ,I{,(, Mane
A. Failinger, "No 11401'1' Dewh.\,": 011 COllsciellC<', Ci\'i/ Di,lO/wilicllc(', lind 1/ NCII Roll' 11'1' Tilfth
COlllmissions, 75 C,M,K,C.L. REV. 401, 420...422 (200fl).
:\7. See. e.g .• CHAM,\II,\,.,. supl'a note 10, at 124-25 (noting Victorian "portrait of le£llinillity" Ih:!t portrayed women a" "illilocent fragile. vulnerable, sexless"),
38, SCI' Solherg, supra note 31. al 17-18.
3Y. See a/so TH()MPSUN. Slipi'll notc 2, at 102 (noting how LUlherans call for a r,:co,!!nitiol1 01'
"the provi,ional nature of
and the Icndcll<'Y of illlCrprCIt'fS to prcslIppllSC and enl'orec
cultural Ilorms and ideologies").
40. See Gerhard 0, Forde. Nil/IIIII", rhe Olle Who Is AbOl'C Us, ill SPEAf.:IMJ 01' '1'111, CIII{IS ..
[IAN GOD: THE HOLY TRINITY AND 'IIIL' CHAI.LENGES OF FEMINISM I J O. 113-14 (Alvin F. Kimel.
Jr .. cd., Eerdman's, 1(92) (noting that God is "Ilyingi in wait for LIS in our attempts to speak or
him," [hat "Gnd is ,
'the ah,conder: the nnc who wills not to be secn by us in his 'naked
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when the masks are pulled off, God is not revealed but missing. 41 Human
beings will not see God's face or know God truly, except at the foot of the
cross.42 Besides underscoring that no one has noetic privilege, whether she
is the most saintly Christian or most accomplished scholar, this metaphor
reminds us that our quest for understanding about our world is necessarily
risky,43 doomed indeed to a certain amount of failure, but necessarily
undertaken.
C.

A Lutheran Interrogation of Secular Women's Ways of Knowing

On the other hand, a Lutheran feminist might expect that any contextual exploration of women's situation in work and the family be fuller than
those explorations traditionally demanded by secular feminists. That is, she
might well demand that women's moral and spiritual lives, and their interactions with the divine as well as the material world, be part of the way in
which women's experience is understood. 44 To understand the experience
of a sexually harassed woman, for example, through the narrow lens of her
interactions with her harasser in the workplace, without exploring how her
relationships with her God and others may shape or alter her experience of
oppression, is to trivialize a woman's life and give her harasser more power
over reality than he deserves or even believes he has. As I will suggest, at
the core of their experience, Christians, perhaps with others whose life experiences transcend material reality, understand themselves as beloved and
free. This real experience will alter their interactions with even the most
oppressive workplaces in which they find themselves.
One consequence of feminists' own success in undermining the Western philosophical project is that they, too, have gone on a hunt for some
unshakable foundation for understanding the nature of social and economic
relations between men and women-for something we can know truly
about the core or essence of those relations. In that search, feminists have
sometimes bitterly fought with those who claim to locate, sometimes in
some remembered past, an ideal socioeconomic relation that represents the
authentic women's experience.45 Thus, feminists have attacked those, some
of them religious people, who propose to order social relations according to
majesty' "); see also THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 22-25 (describing God's hiddenness, particularly
in the cross).
41. See Paul Chung, The Future of Martin Luther in Asian Context, 42 D[ALOG 62 (2003);
MART[N LUTHER, 14 LUTHER'S WORKS: SELECTED PSAl,MS 114 (Jaroslav Pelikan ed., Concordia
Pub. House 1958) (noting that human works are "the masks of our God, behind which He wants to
remain concealed and do all things").
42. See SOLBERG, supra note 5, at 83-87.
43. See Pederson, supra note 5, at 9.
44. See, e.g., SOLBERG, supra note 5, at 36-37 (noting how traditional epistemologies "erase,
exploit, [and] marginalize" women and the demand for women to be included as legitimate
"knowers" and subjects of knowledge).
45. See, e.g., Taub & Schneider, supra note 11, at 13-15 (describing the ideology of separate
spheres).
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theories of complementarity between men and women,~(' And they have
resisted the identification of physical or emotional attributes or functions as
characterizing the "essence of vvomanhood:' stressing the vast diversity in
women's character. biology and experience.~7
With other feminists. Lutherans would agree that neither any past nor
any current social and economic order is the natural order for relations between women and others in this world. To be sure. Lutheran doctrine
evinces a robust sense of natural law. Tn discerning that law, howevcr,
Lutherans part company with those who aSSllme that some historical or idealized social and economic rclationship reflects the natural order of work
and the family.~') Given their view of the pervasiveness of sin, Lutherans
would be likely to warn that both past and future orders can only rightly be
understood as the frail. broken and limited embodiments of just relatiolls at
best.~1J Thus, the relationship between work. women and the family that we
see around us, whether in highly industrialized societies or in agrarian communities. is highly unlikely to renect God';., plan for human community
given the intransigence of human ::.in, such a;., the desire to dominate and to
create hierarchies of worth. To rest any hope for our future in any "good old
days"-whether they arc captured in cipher;., such as the 1950s or the
1960s-is not only unrealistic but likely to be the product of corrupted
wishful thinking.
Christian feminism. however. would logically counsel feminists to be
wary of the many false gods \vhich beckon as feminist;., work to achieve
workplace and family justice for women. A Christian feminist might protest
that the familiar ideological foundations upon which feminist thinkers have
attempted to construct a way forward turn oul. upon reflection, to be unstable. For example. some feminists have embraced the fact of human and
cultural difference as a foundation upon which the problem of gender domination can be resolved, ~ I By making plural ism the watchword of the fcmi46, Sf'/', e,g .• ROSb~I.\HY

R\[)HlRD Rl I 1'l1tl<, \\'()~I\Ma 'IDleS: RI .\DIM"

TO",\1<1l .\ FI:MI

'iISI TIIIOIO(;Y 61-65 119R5) Idescnhing the hi,toncal way in which "oillell" lillTcrcncc is u;,ed
tu slihordlllatc thelll): B.\LR. supra note 9, at 40 (lh:scnhing the way gendel dirtcrenc.: is used to
create hierarchy): TIIOMI'SON, -'111m; nOI\: 2, at 97-99 Idcscrihlllg iel11il11s1 challenges to Chnstian
IlJerarchics L
47, See, e,g., CL\!{I DAI.TOI';, Where WE Siall": O/?,ermilolls Oil rile Sil!((Ii/(}lI of Ft'lIIinil'(
I.egal TilOugill, ill FE\lI""1
T'II<'RY FOI.'NIMTIO;>';S ,,2, :14-37 (D, Kelly Wcisherg cd ..
19'ri) (descrihing the potential draw hacks as well as henefits of discussing "wolllen's
experience"),
41\, See GU)]{GE W, FORlLl, FT .\1.., LIITlIF.R AND Cl'l.ITRE 14-16 (1960),
ROIlIRT BE'i."'I.. Til!., P.\R\l}()XIC\L VISION: A Pl'llLiC TI1HIU)(;Y FOR IIII
49. Sec.
TWENTy-FIRST C""TIII{ y 76-77 (1995) (noting Lutheran and Augustlllwn "il:\'S tilat humans arc
in a fallen state and without positi\\: law human helllgS wOllld "act like ncasts," particlilarly, in
collectiv.:s),
:'i0, Id. at 90-92 (notlll!,! the error 01 Reformed and Cath(llic 'lewS till!! sallation IS possibk
through polillcal or social transfonnati'1i1, or through transformation loy the Church),
:; I See. e,g., ell \\IALLI\S. sUlml note 10, at 56-57 Idescrining cultural feminism's attempts
to argue for changes In law nascd on tClllalc Htlucs and virtue,;),
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nist project, or in Christian terms, uncritically embracing as good the
diversity of creation, some feminists may hope to bridge the divide between
persons and to demolish the hierarchies of worth that have bedeviled
women. 52
Such feminists can encounter serious dilemmas as they attempt to both
embrace human diversity and challenge the social construction of women's
place in public work and the family in many cultures around the world that
saddle women with the most burdensome and least rewarded forms of
work. Must a feminist who has staked her philosophical position on the
embrace of diversity simply accept a social order in which women are denied the right to accumulate or own property, to engage in public work that
pays enough to support their children, or to find a level of work that does
not put them in an early grave? If a Western feminist mounts a critique of
such orders, is she being hegemonic or paternalistic, or imposing her culture's views on other cultures instead of respecting their differences ?53
A Lutheran feminist would likely respond to this problem by arguing
that diverse social and economic structures throughout the world must be
interrogated with a two-fold approach. On one hand, feminists must be prepared to be critical of difference, of those structures that oppress women
and children in both family and work life after a careful study of the meaning, tragedy and joy of those women's and their children's lives. If women
are dying early in some cultures because they shoulder too many of the
burdens and receive too few of the needed benefits of work, the claim that
this situation must be tolerated in the name of diversity has no moral
standing.
On the other hand, feminists must be careful not to re-create hierarchies of worth by too quickly describing particular forms of women's work
or women's situations as demeaning, void of dignity, or inconsistent with
the abstract notions of equality that have fueled change in Western countries. 54 To ground our investigation of women's work in the realization that
all humanly-created social and economic structures participate in both the
goodness of creation and the corruption of sin makes such a renexive critique possible. That renexivity enables feminists to speak as sisters with
52. See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10, 80 (1987) (arguing that the celebration of difference can pennit
"new bases of connection" between peoples, therefore emphasizing our common humanity).
53. See, e.g., Phoebe A. Haddon, All the Difference in the World: Listening and Hearing the
Voices of Women, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTs. L. REV. 377, 383 (1999) (noting that "although many
global feminists continue to press the universality of human rights, charges of imperialism and
ethnocentric myopia have figured prominently in discussions about human rights and women and
are conspicuous in the discussion of [female genital mutilation],,).
54. See, e.g., Shelley Wright, Women and the Global Economic Order: A Feminist Perspective, 10 AM. U. J. hH'L L. & POL'y 861, 873 (1995) (noting that a feminist focus on the unfairness of women's traditional roles in third world cultures may paint women as victims or
individuals, "replicating ... economic and social constructions which oppress women and trap
them in positions of exploitation").
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oppressed women in naming the injustice that pervades their work and family relations, while training a self-critical eye on both the terrible tlaws of
their mvn cultures and the hierarchical and self-congratulatory assumptions
that infect their own critique.
In a Lutheran feminist view, other feminists may be tempted too easily
to gravitate toward power as the essential attribute of human relations and
as the solution for liberating women from oppression in work and family
life:':- Oppression, in the view of many dominance feminists as well as
other egalitarian feminists. i~ captured in the politicaL social and economic
power that men have exercised over women. 56 If only, they seem to sugwomen can overcome men's power and achieve power over their individual lives and bodics. or within sociaL political or economic structures,
egalitarian workplaces and family life can be theirs.57
Because Lutheran and other Christian feminists recognize God's hand
in the ongoing creation of the world, however, they would most likely reject
the descriptions of those dominance feminists or others who portray malefemale relations in the workplace as essentially or immutably organized
around the subordination of female victims by males, as a power dynamic
that is unbreakable.'''' Just as Lutherans recognize the natural order not as an
eternal verity but as a dynamic set of relationships continually being recreated by God, so they recognize that God moves with us through history,
re-creating even oppressive social structures into tentatively more just
ones.:"C) These historical revisions of social structures are, of course, only
tentatively more just because they are being constantly re-transformed by
sinners illto new unjust structures. Lutherans, at least when they are being
properly Lutheran. avoid the temptation to declare the triumph of God's
justice. Because God is always and essentially other than us, God is alway"
sitting in judgment of this world and pronouncing its sins,60 Thus. women
must view warily each innovation in workplace equality, whether it is freeing them for deeper participation in public life through more equal educational opportunities or publicly acknowledging their need to balance their
work and horne responsibilities; every innovation is potentially subject to
deforming influences by both men and women. fathers and mothers. Indeed,

s,·"

55.
SOLR/-Reo. slIl'ra nole 5, at 110-1 I (erHiljlling a theology of glory that fOI'U,C:, on
pm\icr over others).
56. See Clli\"L\J J\>,lupru n,)IC 10. :1145-46, 49-50. 52-:'\3 (dc,cribing M,l<;KinnOll', dPIllInance [hemy. her propo,al to focus on eradicatl(lll of sexual dominance, and "'/lle kl11lnist-;'
concerns thai do III 111 <lncc ['leOr\ clllpha,i/,ed \'ictillllnllioll and not "'omen' s agcncy).
57. Id. al 4!)-~().
'i" See SOLBU(( .. \III""lllote 5. at 110,,11 (noting thal theologies or glory. oased on po\\('r as
domination. can he qucslioll<:ti).
5<). See, <,.g .. S(Jl-flU",. SIII'1'lI /lore 5. ar DS (discll"ing the impDrtam:e of "hope In G()(rS
transformativc solilbrity with the world in its brokenness:' which guiiics "our knowing and our
doing" in the world).
KY"\lll. wpm nOLl' 5. at 45-46 (descrioing Luther's cliscu;"joll of the way in
60.
\vhi<:h all human cle,cendanls live "in the aftermath of thc scntenee that God pn)J1()lInl.'ecl").
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those women who are prepared to recognize that sin is a continuing fact of
life and that the structures of sin are constantly changing may be more empowered to speak truthfully about the ways in which women subordinate
each other as they achieve platforms of power previously occupied only by
men.
A Lutheran feminist might, then, engage this problem of understanding
the world of work as it affects women and their families by acknowledging
that women or feminists have no privileged stance when it comes to understanding how social and economic structures affect the interplay of work
and family simply because they are women. 61 They can claim no new
founding principle upon which a just workplace or just society can be securely built. Indeed, we shall never find any completely secure noetic methodology in this world upon which human beings can stand. Ultimately, for a
Lutheran feminist, when all human constructions have been deconstructed
for what they are-violent, hegemonic, self-aggrandizing, partial-no substitute theory or narrative will arise that will obviate the problem of human
sin and finitude in the interpretive process.
Thus, all perspectives must interrogate each other to identify the sin
that lies within them. Women, like all others, must interrogate the imbalance in their own perspectives-their over-preoccupation with the evils that
they themselves endure as well as their willingness to overlook the evil they
do to others and to be indifferent to the evil suffered by those at some
remove from their own daily lives. And, critically, they must confess their
willingness, in their legitimate search to name their own oppressors, to
overlook the reality of the freedom and dignity conferred upon them by
God that overwhelms any oppression, significant or not, which they suffer.
II.

INTERROGATING RELATIONALlTY: SUBORDINATION,
WOMEN'S WORK AND SELF-SACRIFICE

As I will argue here, feminist jurisprudence and Christian theology
share an ontological vision that is characterized by relationality. This vision
rejects a moral view of persons as "authentic [selves who are] autonomous,
unified, free, and self-made, standing apart from history and affiliations,
choosing [their] lifeplan for [themselves]."62 Professor Susan Stabile has
described this relationality with respect to the vertical (God-human) and
horizontal (human-human) dimensions always recognized in the Christian
tradition:
With respect to our relationship to God, it is not just that we are
relational, but that we are loved and exist as persons capable of
61. See SOLBERG, supra note 5, at 41, 43 (noting the importance of recognizing women's
possible participation in structures of oppression even while including them as epistemological
subjects).
62.

IRIS MARION VOtiNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE

45 (1990).
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loving. We live in relation to, and in dependence on, a living God
who is love and who loves each of us into being. And we exist
endowed with the capacity to realize self "through a sincere gift
of self:' With respect to our constitutive relationship to others,
that human beings are relational by nature means "that [our] personal good-far from being opposed to the common good-is
actually achieved through [our] participation in and contribution
to this communal good." Our self-realization is achieved in
community.6'
Work is an exercise in relationality, responsiveness both to the Giver
of all life and the natural and human objects of one's work. Elsewhere, I
have argued that human heings participate in four concrete relations as they
work, each of them laced with the ambivalence of goodness and evil: their
relationships with a co-creating, active God (the vertical relationship), with
their co-workers and with those for whom they work (the horizontal relationship), and with the ohjects of their work. 64
In this section, J will focus on only two difficulties which arise out of
the ambivalence of women's relationships with God and with those for
whom they work. First, women may be either victims or perpetrators of evil
because men or women forget that they are co-creators with God. Second,
in their desire to care for others. women may fail to acknowledge that they
are also creatures. limited in their ability to respond to the needs and desires
of others with whom they are in a relationship,

A.

Women as Co-Creators ({nd the Problem qf Responsible Agency
In recognizing that women are co-creators with God, Lutheran femi-

nism recognizes that women are responsible agents, that is, that they are
actively involved in the world and morally accountable for the action they
take. Christian feminists claim that just work enables each person, in her
daily life. to be both an active agent and a responsive recipient, loving and
being beloved of God and others in her full dignity as a person created in
Ihe image of God. 65 At the same time, Christian feminists must be the realists among the hopeful, recognizing that in a fallen creation, women as both
agents and recipients will work in conditions that reHect both great opportunity and great finitude. In each work situation, they will encounter the
goodness that inheres in God's active participation in the ongoing creation
of the world and the evil that necessarily accompanies human striving. 66
6.l Sll~an Stabile. COI1 Secular Feminists lind Calho/ic Feminists Work I,)gefher fo Ease the
COlljlici Sehreell W()rk and Filmily). 4 Sr. THOMAS LJ. 343. 434-35 (2007).
64. Sec Maric A. Failinger. "Too Cheal' Work fill' 111l"bodv Bur Us ": Tillmrd (/ Theory Will
Proctice a/Good Child IJliJor, 35 RUTGEI{S LJ. J0:15, I090-IJO (2004).
(}5. See Pope John Paul II, Lailorem EXl'rcm.\, No.4 (Dec. 16. 1996), amilaNe or http://

www.cill.org/jp2ency/labGfcln.hlml.
66. Sec Marc Kolden. Work and A-f(,({lling: Some Thc%gi('(l/ Reflecliol1s, at 2 http://www.
Illtherscm.cull/mkolden/Work'fr20&(k20Meaning.pdr thereinafter Kolden, Work {llld A-Ieollillg I:
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At the base of all understandings of human work on this earth is the

recognition that human beings are constantly creating creatures of an innovating God who hides in the shadows of humans' work, his hiddenness
exacerbating workers' anxiety and insecurity.67 In Lutheran terms, women
and men co-create with God, and God constantly works at creation through
them. They work on this earth as God's partners in the tasks of changing
and preserving this world. 68 That this work is co-operative may be hidden
from our consciousness as we go about our daily life,69 but the influence of
God's work upon us is ever-present.
Feminists are understandably squeamish about how Christians have
traditionally talked about their co-creative responsibilities with God. In the
Catholic documents on work such as Rerum Novarum and Laborem Exere ens, for example, the language of dominion over and the command to
subdue the earth70 is prominent, emphasizing that the world's resources are
available to human use insofar as they "come[] within the range of man's
influence and of his striving to satisfy his needs.'>71 When such language is
coupled with ancient (albeit non-Christian) understandings that women and
children are lesser beings than free men,n these assays seem to justify the
very subordination that feminists have staked their lives on eliminating.
Moreover, in its resonance with physical force, the language of subduing or
dominating seems directly at odds with the egalitarian, reciprocal relationships that feminists advocate with other persons and the natural world.
Yet, Christian scholars have argued that these texts certainly do not
justify the subordination of some humans by others?3 And while it would
be too much to gainsay the hierarchical implications of the language used to
Marc Kolden, The Christian's Calling in the World, Part 4, http://www.luthersem.edu/rnkoldenl
resourcesfThe%2OChristian's%20Calling%20in%20the%20World.htm; MARC KOLDEN, Luther on
Vocation, in 3/4 WORD AND WORLD 382, 386 (1983), available at http://www.luthersem.edu/word
&world/Archives/3-4_Luther/3-4_Kolden.pdf.
67. See THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 146 (noting that the "hidden, subversive presence of God
emerges in the most unexpected of places" and "inevitably leads to anxiety among those struggling toward faithful existence before God").

68. See Kolden, Work and Meaning, supra note 66, at I; Marc Kolden, The Idea (~f Christian
Vocation in Light of Feminist Critiques, at 3, http://www.luthersem.edu/mkolden/ST3423/
FEMINIS_CRLpdf. (hereinafter Kolden, The Idea of Christian Vocation].
69. See Kolden, The Idea of Christian Vocation, supra note 68, at 3.
70. See Pope Leo Xlll, Rerum Novarum, No.6, (May 15, 1891), available at http://www.
ewtn.com/library/ENCYCIL13RERUM.HTM; Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, supra note
65, at No.4).
71. Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, supra note 65, at No.4.
72. See RICHARD SENNETI, FLESH Al'<D STONE: THE BODY AND THE CITY IN WESTERN CIYl
LlZATION 41-44 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1994).
73. See. e.g., Theodore Hiebert, Rethinking Dominion Theology, 25 DIRECTION 16, 21-24
(1996), available at http;llwww.directionjounral.orgfartic1eI?922 (arguing that the Genesis texts
may be read to require humans to mimic God's benevolent exercise of power in accordance with
divine intentions and act as stewards of creation).
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describe humans' responsibility toward the natural world,7" as a worked-out
practice, these Christian directives need not necessarily take only the ncgative connotations that feminists associate with it. As the Catholic documents
suggest, the divine offer of the world's rich resources to human beings ensures freedom from their own necessity, from the very limitations of skeleton and muscle that constitute the human creature. Without such di vine
generosity, human existence. much less human freedom-our ability to
transcend the work of physieal survival to create the artifacts of human
civilization and to contemplate human truth- could hardly exist. 75 Without
the divine permission for human beings to make use of their external world.
human history and culture could not exist. 7b Indeed, without our right to
actively engage the material world's riches, human purpose toward an end
such as justice would be impossible.
Nevertheless. with secular feminists, Christian feminists would acknowledge how quickly those who are given power over the earth's human
and material resources exploit them for their own purposes. 77 often hiding
behind a false justification. In Christian terms. it is critical to recognize how
work becomes fallen when workers forget their interdependence with their
co-creator, or their existence. at one and the same time. as the creatures of a
loving God.
The subordination in work and family that many women have experienced over the centuries cannot simply be traced to their own inadequacies
or poor judgment in looking after their own self-interests. We need to
frankly acknowledge how much of this subordination is the result or men's
misuse of the gifts of this creation. We might even say that forgetting their
responsibility to their divine partner, men who have been given political,
legal and social responsibility to create and sustain forms of public life have
come to imagine their own positions and desires as equal to their Creator's.
The phenomenon of workplace sexual harassment is a good illustration of
what comes when human beings distort their creative responsibility to destroy those whose lives have been placed in their charge, when they confuse
domination and desire.7~ These supervisors have forgotten not only the intrinsic dignity and worth with which each of their workers is endowed but
74. Id. at 18-19 (noting that the Hebrew word for dlllllinion i:, radah. c'itabli"hing a hkrarehy of p(lWer and authority and granting hunnlb the
to govern creation).
75. Pope John Paul II. L"horelll EvrC(,IIS.IUIJI'(I no!.: 65. at NO.5.
76. SCI' id. at NO.6.
77. For :,ccular feminist cxal1lples. sec Llo' n & VI:RClliCK. supm note 7. at 24 (de:,crihing
dominance feminist arguments that patriarchy gives men dominance and privilege. while :,ubordiflating women); M1NOW. supm note 4. at 236-37 (describing way' in WhU:ll majority women's
power tn stereotype leads to exclusion and control of minority women).
78. Sec, e.g .• Jane Dwa:,i. Kcn\'{/: A Swil\' ill Ill/ematiol/al Lahor SWl1dards ({lid Their F.ffec/
011 Workillg Womell ill lJi'\'c!opillg COlllI/ries: Tile Case fii/' llIfegm/ioll of' F.llforc(,lIIell/ !.Islies ill
the World BallA Po/kips. 17 WIS. b. r'L L.J . .'147. 357 (Dwasi claimed thai "endemic" l1on~
remedied sexual h:wJssmeni in the Kenyan \vprkplace "traps W()l11en in sitnations where they arc
helpless and desperate." because of the potential loss of jobs. promotions or salary increase;" and
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also the responsibility placed in their hands to care for the creation. We
might even say that harassers have refused to consider how God the Creator
would approach women workers, and transform their self-interested trajectory of power into stewardship of and for the creation.
Another form of sin sometimes identified with women as workers in
public life and the family is that they forget they are made for responsible
freedom. Women can forget their power as co-creators and deny any responsibility for the external world. Conceiving themselves as invisible in
public life, in particular, women workers may come to be uncertain of, or
even to deny, their agency. Lutheran theologian Marc Kolden reminds us
that this form of sin is just as great as the "male" sin of distorting one's
freedom to avoid responsibility for others' welfare. 79
[H]umans as portrayed in the Bible are a unity of spirit and body,
of image of God and dust of the earth, of freedom and finitude. , .. This awareness gives rise to anxiety because humans
know both their greatness and their fragility .. , .
[One way] in which the root sin of unbelief manifests itself ...
involves fleeing from freedom and responsibility, denying the
human's unique relationship to God, and sinking into finitude.
Here, it is not a creature's over-reaching, but an under-valuation
of being created by God, in God's image. This has been called
"sensuality" (better, sensateness) or despair (or sloth or conformity), It too is a form of saving the self, one might argue, byeliminating the perceived instability of being both free and finite and
settling for finitude alone. 80
Even more powerfully, theologian Dorothee Soelle asks women to ask
themselves:
Can I affirm myself as one who is made from dust? Can I say that
my having been created is very good? How do I, as a person
made from dust, respond to the ontological project of being created for freedom? ... Is it possible for me to value my 'creatureliness' in the knowledge that my existence was willed prior to my
birth, that I am not here on this earth simply by chance, that I am
needed, that I am not a disposable object, and that I am designed
for freedom and equality?81
Those who have studied the relationship between technology and
human workers have documented the tragic effects when workers forget
demonstrates that "men do not believe in the autonomy and dignity of women as sellers of labor
power." Dwasi noted the Kenyans' refusal to acknowledge sexual harassment).
79. Kolden, The Idea of Christian Vocation, supra note 68, at 6.
80. [d. at 5-6.
81. DOROTHEE SOELLE & SHIRLEY A. CLOYE,.<;, To WORK AND TO LOVE: A THEOLOGY OF
CREATION 29 (1984).
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their own agency in the world. In Pope John Paul Irs words, technology
"can ceasc to be man's ally and become almo;-,t hi" enemy, cb when the
mechanization of work 'supplants' him ... or when. through exalting the
machine. it reduces man to the status of irs :,;!ave:'''' To follow John Pau]""
claims directly, the tragic outcomes of sinful employment "tructurei'> are not
only evidenced in the harms of carelessly adopted technology but abo the
invisible damage caused by night work;"4 they extend to more scriolls lifethreatening and reproductive-damaging dangers of industrial safety
hazards X" and agricultural poisons. xc, Over the decades of women's publ ic
work, Illany have also been damaged as moral persons, too quick to accept
others' judgments that they are not capable of some kinds of public responsibilities, from executive oversight to heavy physical labor. Many of these
more intangible forms of oppression are a direct result of women's acculturation into an acceptance of the view that they are not agents in public life.
While many educated young women in modern industrialized coul1trie~ are
raised without this self-imagination, I would venture to suggest that
throughout the world as a whole. this view that womcn are not appropriate
agents in public life still predominates.
To accept one's status as a creator. ai'> one "designed for freedom and
equality" carries with it the necessity to accept women' s responsibility for
the harm they caLl~e as agents in the world, One of the conflicts that contemporary feminist jurisprudential scholars have brought to Iight-conllkt
between women as employers and employees-results from the increasing
economic and social resources that professional women have access to ill
many countries. x7 Feminists debate, for example. whether women should
hire other \vomen to do their domestic work, from cleaning toilets to caring
for children. xK They ponder what responsibilities feminists have not only to
treat their workers in an atmosphere of respect but also to provide remuner112. See
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X3. See L.ahon/1/ EX('I'celis. supra note 65. al 5.
X4, Se('. e.g .. Chri,tille H;Jight Farley. A1ell lv1"r Work j/'O/1/

SW) Iii SUIl. hlf! WOil/ei/ ',1 Wor,z 1.1
NCler DOlie: fn/emlitiOlI({I Lali' ({liIlliIe Regulalion of WOlI!el/'s \\forA (// ;Vh,JlI. 4 ('m!'!r·s: Hl 'fT,

W')'vll,"', J.L &: Soc. P'lI
44.52-53
,Ieep
and fatiguc. ,mel Ilcgillivc
effect, on family and ,ocial Itve;;, illcluding social isolation and lonclilles" attrihuted to night
work).
~5
SCI', e.g., DW;I,i, SlIpru !lote 7x, al 3() I. 36.1-64 (dc,cribing rrcljllcnl \\orkplacc accidents
ill Kenya. death, fWIll fire ill ha7ardolls workplaces in Thailand :rnc! Chim. healings and dusty
workplace, endured hy women in I-\ondura,).
X(), /d. a[ 361-h2 (dc'LTibing pregnancy-related ,tillbir(h,. birth tlekcls. and brca,1 Gillecr
suffered b\ agricultural wt1rkers in lte\eloping cOllnlrie" and hat::m,b from ,nake, and oiller f:l1'Il]
ehClllicab).
X7. See, I')! .. Donna E. Young, Working Aero.\s Horder,l. GloiJal Rl'.ltrucfllrillg Ulld WOlllell',1
Work, 20() 1 U I All L RIe\, 1, 4-5. 7-9 (noting incrca,ing race alll! class ,egregatiOIl 111 dOllle,sue
..:I10l'C' due to professiollal women', arllucncc).
X~. Id al I h-11I (dc:-cribing emotional conniel in an African American professional woman
who had diffie-ultic, with hinng other women of color to de) dOBlc:-tic work),
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ation beyond what existing labor laws require--e.g., a living wage rather
than the minimum wage, adequate health insurance and other benefits, accommodations when their own workers' families need them in times of
illness or trouble. 89
In accepting their status as agents, as co-creators, professional women
in these situations can acknowledge their responsibility for those whom
they employ. They can begin to confess their own indifference to the need,
and exploitation, of those who serve them as domestic and service and child
care workers, and instead change their employment practices to comport
with these workers' needs and dignity. Similarly, accepting their status as
agents in the private sphere, women can begin to acknowledge how they
employ their power over family members, particularly their children, in distorted ways to meet their own desires for control of their circumstances, for
recognition, and for satisfaction of their physical and emotional needs.
The legal implications of women's acceptance of their status as responsible agents are both jurisprudential and practical. On the practical
level, Christian feminists should join with secular feminists in advocating
for the equality of "women's work" such as child care and housekeeping
vis-a-vis the legal protections now extended to "public workers," such as
wage and hour protections, worker's compensation and unemployment benefits. On a jurisprudential level, Christian feminists need to engage secular
feminists and other feminists of faith to consider how the analysis of gender
subordination in work changes when women acknowledge their co-responsibility with men for forms of workplace oppression. For example, the light
that has been shined on the evils of sexual harassment needs to be broadened to find theories of, and remedies for, other forms of workplace abuse
that women supervisors as well as men engage in; feminists need to analyze
the distinctive ways in which these forms of abuse make women's professional advancement difficult.
B.

Women as Creatures and Women's Response to Need

Counterbalancing the difficulty women have in recognizing ourselves
as agents, as co-creators, the Christian message calls women to acknowledge that they are creatures as much as created, limited in what they can
accomplish as well as free to achieve. Modern women, in particular, have
struggled with their sense of failure as they are overwhelmed with the physical and emotional needs of children, spouses, and those with whom they
89. Id. at 64-68 (noting that patriarchy claims must be re-thought in light of actions of women who benefit from the law's exclusion of domestic workers from many protections, and arguing that feminists must look at the global forces that influence the lives of both privileged women
and foreign domestic workers); id. at 30-35 (describing the many protections that domestic workers cannot take advantage of, from minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to workers
compensation coverage, unemployment benefits, civil rights, and health and safety laws in many
states).
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interact in the workplace,'!o Raised to be responsive and responsible. many
women quickly find themselves in impossible situations as they try both to
honor the heavy commitments naturally entailed by their relationships to
others and meet the demands that those others place on them. some of
which are perversely unrealistic.
In order for women to recognize themselves as creatures of God, they
do not need to subordinate themselves to the domination of others' desires
or even needs. Instead, women are called to freedom. To accept one's status
as a creature is to accept with humility, if not always with joy, the finitude
that the Creator places upon us in the act of making, the limitations of being
a creature. It is to be actively conscious that. our bodies, hearts and spirits
are de:-.igned to be finite, in a way that accepts those limitations humbly and
gratefully without turning away from responsible agency. By accepting
their status as creatures, women can acknowledge the limits of their ability
to participate in the many forms of work to which they nre called without
either walking away from their public callings because they cannot satisfy
every demand of their family, or conversely, walking a\vay from their responsibilities to spouses and children because acknowledging that these responsibilities cannot be perfectly fulfilled is too painful.
Moreover. if women can honestly recognize the inherent sinfulness
and finitude that marks women's lives, they can begin to be honest about
the costs of their many callings. For example. women can begin to admit
how their professional victories and promotions come with a necessary
price for their children and husbands and others without being overwhelmed by guilt because they cannot be as perfect as the Creator. They
can begin to admit hmv their need to be thought perfect caregivers and
nurturers can destroy their very ability to carry out those tasks by robbing
women of their health, their emotional resources, indeed the very love that
drives their responsiveness. They can acknowledge how their desire to meet
every need and demand of loved ones can become a form of idolatry. not
unlike the idolatry of those men who insist that their every need and desire
be met by their wives, mothers or other loved ones.
Secular feminism has already led the way in developing legal responses to the problem of women's difficulties in accepting their limitations
as creatures. sllch as family leave legislation. In addition to supplying a
theological explanation for why such legislation is necessary and appropriate, Christian legal feminists can join with secular feminists in exploring the
social and psychological forces that pressure women to forget their creaturely limitations. Moreover, Christian legal feminism offers potential resources for developing a theory about humane work environments that can
90, Sec, e.~ .. Sll~A" BI<O""MII.I.f'R. FEMINL'IIY ;: 14-215 (1984) (descrihing Ihe prevalence
of maternal guilt); A,,'<!: WILSON SOIAEF. WOM"'" S REALITY 70-71 (1981) (descrihing how women afe IIlade to feci guilty when they are nnl fulfilling their roles Of dOll1g whal is expe.:ledL
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begin to interrogate the systemic deprivations of spirit as well as body, permitted and encouraged by law, that modem workplace conditions foster.
III.

FEMINISM AND PRIVATE WORK: FITflNG AND WORTHY WORK

As suggested earlier, modem educated feminists face another dilemma
in their relationship to work and the family, the influence of sin on a good
creation: they face a Hobson's choice if they spend their energy in work
that is meaningful because it is relational but is devalued by society. We
might frame this dilemma by observing a recent culture wars clash between
feminist Linda Hirshman and her conservative detractors, such as Focus on
the Family's James Dobson, over what has traditionally been called "women's work."91 Hirshman argues:
The family-with its repetitious, socially invisible, physical
tasks-is a necessary part of life, but it allows fewer opportunities
for full human flourishing than public spheres like the market or
the government. This less-flourishing sphere is not the natural or
moral responsibility only of women. Therefore, assigning it to
women is unjust. Women assigning it to themselves is equally
unjust. To paraphrase, as Mark Twain said, "A man who chooses
not to read is just as ignorant as a man who cannot read."92
Accusing Hirshman of claiming that stay-at-home mothers are a
"threat to civilization," Dobson has countered that "motherhood is just continuing to be assaulted by the media and the loony left." Dobson has gone
on to talk about the "untouchable American values of motherhood, the flag"
and apple pie,93 implicitly suggesting that home-work for women, particularly the care of children, is of the highest value.
Even if unintentionally, Hirshman's views echo the ancient, nonChristian distinction, carried over into modem times by philosophers like
Hannah Arendt and political movements like Marxism, about the relative
worth of various forms of human endeavor. Arendt, for example, distinguished between the less worthy if necessary "labor," the work of survival,
from putting food on the table to wiping babies' bottoms, and what she
termed worthier human "work" and "action."94 Marxists who offer a some91. Young. supra note 87, at 2 ("Work perfonned within the home, the work most associated
with women's supposed 'natural' tendency toward nurturing, is the prototype of 'women's
work."').
92. Linda Hirshman, Homeward Bound, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT ONLINE, Nov. II, 1995,
http://www.prospect.org/web/page. ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleld= 10659.
93. See Dobson, Mohler Invented Controversial Statements by Feminist Linda Hirshman.
MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA, April 3, 2006, http://mediamatters.org/itemsl200604030002.
94. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 83-85, 136-39 (Univ. of Chicago Press
1969) (1958). Arendt described "work," as the creation of objects for non-survivalist ends, such as
beauty. She prized, above all, what she tenned "action," public, especially political, words and
actions that are more distinctively human because they can be remembered in history. Arendt
relies heavily on the ancient Greeks, who understood women's work as "enslaving" and the ability
to shove such work off to another as freeing. Id. at 83-84.
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what converse hierarchy, prizing skilled over intellectual labor:)5 make the
same error.
Christian feminism has sornething to contribute to the recognition of
women's work as not only necessary but also worthy. Secular feminist accounts of the value of women' s work. particularly the care of the family,
struggle to offer a sustainable rationale for treating such work as equal to
the work of public life.'){' As Hirshman's argument implies. the "diversity"
or "choice" rationale that some offer to justify the equal value of women's
work is essentially hollow: if work is valuable simply because women
choose it, then it becomes impossihle to critique any woman's choice of any
work. informed or free or not. Under this theory, prostitution and pornography become as valuahle forms of work as making a family dinner or running a corporation. Similarly. utilitarian justifications for the value of
women's work-that is, this work is necessarily done by someone, therefore it has value-contain no critical edge. They permit work that entails
difficulty and drudgery to be foisted upon women simply on utilitarian
ground:-. and because they are the last to object.
By contrast, the Christian tradition has rejected any attempts to identify particular forms of work as more worthy than other forms of work, :-.0
long as that work serves the dignity of the human person and the purpose of
human life. (Such a theory, of course, can distinguish between caring for
children and
in prostitution.) The papal encyclical Labort'1lI E\:ercells points out how, in the Christian story, the divine identifies with what
is considered the most lowly work, Jesus serving as carpenter, as fisherman,
feeder of others. As the encyclical interprets, this example shows
that the hasis for determining the value of human work is not
primarily the kind of work being done but the fact that the one
who is doing it is a person. The sources of the dignity of work are
to be sought primarily in the subjective dimension, not in the objective one,'!x
In my own Lutheran tradition, ~artin Luther used the term "Beruf'
(calling) to suggest that the value of one's work does not inhere in its own
nature, but in the fact that it is done in service to the neighbor.'!9 Although
the person in freedom can choose not to answer this call, understanding that
95. ,\('e Arendt. supm nOle 94. '1l 1l7-1-:9: VOL!'. I//pm note iI:!, at 4~ (noling how Marx
cekbrated the world of material production as compared with the work of the phillNlpher m
politician). ,)'cc (/1.1'0 Pope John Paul II. Ltlmrel1l t:rercel/,v, SUflni note 65. at No. 14 (noling Ihe
Marxist pn:fcrcllcc for the malerial and clllkdivc over the spiritual and personal).
96, See.
B,\ER. ,\/ll'ra nOle 9. at 5-6 (noting. ill/er alia, how women haVe: heen "stuck
wilh \vllal men len" and "forced 10 concentrate theIr energies within the 'private' sphere or marriage and ral1lily").
97, Sec Pope John Paul II, Lo/)orclII EXe!CL'flS, supra flote 65, al No, 6,
LJIL Id.
99. SCI' Karll'ricd Fmchlich, ?vtare Kolden & Peler Kruse, LIITiler 011 VocatlOl!. XIII Lt,
J IlI.t<iI" QI'.\I<TERI.Y 195. 91 I I (19l)91. awilaMe ar
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one's work is the response to the cry of the other's need transforms the
debate about what is worthy women's work. Instead of viewing work by the
nature of the activity performed and setting up a facile distinction between
memorable "action" and enslaving "labor," for example, the Christian view
of work focuses on the dual dignity of the one who serves and the one who
is served. The actions of the worker would be holistically prized: not just
the motions or products of body or mind are considered; rather, the Christian view considers the intentionality and spirit with which the worker acts
and the purpose or end which she serves. Similarly, we would not consider
the ones for whom we work as simply the objects of our action, but as
reciprocal partners in the giving and receiving of loving acts, vulnerable
persons whose need gives dignity both to the worker's gift and the recipient's open hands.
This understanding, of course, does not escape the distortion of work
by human sin, particularly, as both Hirshman's and Dobson's arguments
seem to exemplify, because human beings reify certain forms of work as by
their nature more valuable or more fitting for one gender or the other. 100
Dobson's implicit claim that women gain their essential value from motherhood lOl is likewise a reification of work that does not respect the ongoing
dynamic activity of God in creating unique persons, male and female. Certain conditions can alienate women workers, like any others, from their
work because employers expect them to perform tasks not tItted to their
talents or limits, what theologian Miroslav Volf calls their charisms or gifts
of the Spirit. 102 For example, sin may distort the worker's view, or the beliefs of those dependent upon her, about what her proper work is. The demand of the neighbor is not the same as the need of the neighbor. My child
may expect me to pick up her clothes from the floor, but that does not mean
I am called to do so.
Not only can ill-tItting work re-create subordinating hierarchies between the demander and the responder, but work becomes more stressful
and less meaningful to a worker who completes tasks that are ill-fitted to
her talents. One of my friends, Susan, is extremely handy around the house,
my mother is a wonderful quiltmaker, my grandmother was a fine housekeeper. Try as I might, I cannot duplicate their efforts; I do not have these
gifts. Betty Friedan's celebrated message to mid-twentieth century America
can be read as echoing this Christian view, that America's then-social cult
of domesticity was wasting gifts of so many of its middle class women,
assigning them to domestic chores that they did not excel at, producing
depression and a strong sense of meaninglessness. t03 On the other hand,
100. See Hirshman, supra note 92; Dobson, supra note 93.
See Dobson. Mohler Invented Controversial Statements by Feminist Linda Hirshman,
supra note 93.
102. See VOLF, supra note 82, at 104-05, III.
103. See BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMlNlNE MYSnQUE (W.W. Norton 2001) (1963).
101

20071

WOMEN'S WORK

420

women who excel at domestic work can be forced into public work that
they are not suited for or even happy with, because the legally reinforced
economic reward structures of Western capitalism value some forms of
work over others and threaten extreme economic vulnerability to those who
stay at home.
We should not, however, be tempted to assume that the cure for women's subordination is to simply call a truce to the Hirshman-Dobson debate, or the "mommy wars," and to demand that every woman be allowed to
pursue her perfect calling with the respect due her. Given that our world is
both good and fallen, in Christian terms, we need to recogniLe that all work.
public and private. will participate in that fallenness-it will impose drudgery on us as well as fulfill our humanity.lo4 Work in this world is difficult
and demanding, it is "'threatened by failures and wa~tes of time and often
comes to nothing. '" IO~ It involves an "unceasing measure of human toil and
suffering, and also of the harm and injustice which penetrate deeply into
social life within individual nations and on the international icvel."IOh
Christian feminism can recognize. in a way that idealist theories cannot, that the injustice and hardship of women's work life is an inescapable
part of human existence, that there will never be a world in which women
do only that work that pleases and energizes them and contributes to their
own well-being. Christian feminists can acknowledge that work is always
relational, whether it is the work of wiping a child's bottom or merging a
corporation. Such work, in a fallen world, will always be a mix of selfexpression and self-abnegation, engendering meaningful social relations as
well as oppressive. coercive relationships. reconciling humans with the natural world while participating in that world's despoliation by human
selfishness. 107
Moreover, Luther's recognition that we are called to serve on behalf of
the neighbor lOx reminds us that neither private work nor public work is
intrinsically more valuable. Luther recognized that the neighbor we are
called to serve can be as much of a stranger as a family member. and that
his destiny is just as linked with ours as the destiny of our spouses. children.
parents or siblings. 10') Recognizing that we are called to serve others beyond
104. VOLr. slIl'm nole X2. al I 27-2X.
105. Id.
106. See. e.g .. Pope John Paul II. L,,/JorclI1 Ere/'ccns, SlIpril nole 65. al )Jo. I.
107. See SOLLLE . .III/HIt note Rl, at RJ-X4 (describing opportunilies for individuals through
work to develop their facullies. create social relalions and reconcile with nalure).
lOX. Sec Kolden, Wod ({nd Meaning . .11I/,m nole 66. al -I.
109. As one example uf lhis responsihilily for the neighbor. cven if he is a slranger. "hen
LUlher was asked whelher people should fke the plague, he replied lhat hOlh governing aUlhorilies
and private citizens musl stay and help lheir neighhors. 1'01 anyone who docs Hol run the ri,i-- of
losing everything for the neighbor "hut forsai--es him and leaves him lo his Illisfortune hecomes ~I
Illurderer in the sighl 01' God." MARTll'o LI'THER, WIIETIIIf{ Ol'ol M vY FLeE I'R()~l \ DF\rll,
PIACiL'L (1527). rcprillicd ill MARTIN LIIIHEf{'S 8,\SI(' TIIU)J()(,IC,\l. WRIII0J(iS 7-'6. 7-1.'
(Till1olhy F. Lull ed .. 19X9).
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ourselves, in both our private spaces and the public world, helps us to see
how we as workers are dependent upon those for whom we work, that we
need the recipients of our work just as much as they need us. 110 As Soelle
argues, work creates community, reminding workers that they can give as
well as take, teach as well as learn, contribute as well as receive, be needed
by another as well as receive what they need. III
Christian feminist interrogations of social assumptions about the worth
of women's work, whether they are triggered by feminists like Hirshman or
social conservatives like Dobson, are not only valuable for exploding the
"war" over women's private work by showing that both sides' social
"truisms" are thin, inaccurate representations of women's dilemma. They
also offer a new perspective and opportunity to resurrect discussions that
have disappeared from public view in favor of an economic system in
which both men and women are expected to do public work. Early feminist
legal discussions, such as whether mothers should be paid to mother
through family allowances or the distribution of the family's income to
them before or during divorce, can gain new traction as Christian feminists
explore the legal implications of theology on law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Christian feminist legal theory offers a new lens into the difficult dilemmas of women as workers, both in public work and in their work as
parents, spouses and members of families. To a significant extent, what
Christian feminist legal theory has to offer traditional secular feminists is
solidarity: on many issues in which secular feminist theory has led the way
in devising new legal strategies to improve social respect and care for women workers, Christian feminists are in agreement. They can dig from the
well of their own religious commitments to energize the discussion of ideas
that have been stalled in modern social life, providing a more compelling
argument to new audiences not already aligned with the secular feminist
project, and more effectively countering conservative claims about the nature and role of women workers in modern life.
As I have suggested, however, just as the Gospel upends every human
presumption to know the truth about human existence and every attempt by
humans to prefer their own security and worth above others', so too, the
Gospel represents a threat to the various streams of secular feminist legal
theory as it tries to articulate a truly feminist jurisprudence. It will continue
to interrogate and demolish every attempt to found feminist jurisprudence
upon any human resource or principle, just as it will demand the truth from
110. See WILLIAM MAY, THE PHYSICIAN'S COVENANT: IMAGES OF THE HEALER IN MEDICAL

121-23 (2000) (noting the reciprocity between physicians and patients, each of whom
need each other).
111. SOELLE, supra note 81, at 93, 96.
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Christians who live on other evil foundations, such claims that speak falscly
about reified "natural orders" and "worthy" human work that is separated
from a God who makes things new every day. It will necessarily contillue to
challenge feminist claims that explicitly or implicitly raise women's
ence, values, or gifts as essentially unblemished or superior to those or men
or other women, just as it will demand that men' s pride and greed be exposed, The Gospel will demand that feminists continue their introspection
about the ways in which race, class, and geography allow some women to
take advantage of the labor of others. just as it will demand that Christians
take off their blinders to the economic. sociaL and political oppression they
permit to exist in this world. And most importantly, the Lutheran witness to
the Gospel demands that feminist lawyers and legal theori"ts. just like
Christians. not simply say, but do. Luther demandeu of Christians a life.
like his own. that was a continual call to prophesy and repentance. a living
witness about the oppression of this world. but more importantly. action on
behalf of the neighbor: he demanded a "faith active in love."112 Christians
and feminists and lawyers must demand no less.
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